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Abstract. Propensity score methods were proposed by Rosenbaum and
Rubin [Biometrika 70 (1983) 41–55] as central tools to help assess the
causal effects of interventions. Since their introduction more than two
decades ago, they have found wide application in a variety of areas,
including medical research, economics, epidemiology and education, es-
pecially in those situations where randomized experiments are either
difficult to perform, or raise ethical questions, or would require exten-
sive delays before answers could be obtained. In the past few years, the
number of published applications using propensity score methods to
evaluate medical and epidemiological interventions has increased dra-
matically. Nevertheless, thus far, we believe that there have been few
applications of propensity score methods to evaluate marketing inter-
ventions (e.g., advertising, promotions), where the tradition is to use
generally inappropriate techniques, which focus on the prediction of an
outcome from background characteristics and an indicator for the in-
tervention using statistical tools such as least-squares regression, data
mining, and so on. With these techniques, an estimated parameter in
the model is used to estimate some global “causal” effect. This practice
can generate grossly incorrect answers that can be self-perpetuating:
polishing the Ferraris rather than the Jeeps “causes” them to continue
to win more races than the Jeeps ⇔ visiting the high-prescribing doc-
tors rather than the low-prescribing doctors “causes” them to continue
to write more prescriptions. This presentation will take “causality” seri-
ously, not just as a casual concept implying some predictive association
in a data set, and will illustrate why propensity score methods are gen-
erally superior in practice to the standard predictive approaches for
estimating causal effects.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This presentation is very simple in some sense, but
in our experience the issues being discussed are often
misunderstood, despite their importance. The appli-
cation that is used throughout the first sections is a
real one that was encountered nearly a decade ago,
but we think has enough in common with many ap-
plications in business to be of general interest. The
basic situation involves ordering a list of individu-
als to contact (e.g., by telephone or personal visit),
from most likely to generate additional revenue to
least likely to do so. Every effort at contact requires
some investment, and we want to target for contact
those individuals who are most likely to generate
a return on that investment (ROI). The basic con-
fusion in this situation is due to the more general
confusion between a “before–after” change associ-
ated with an intervening event and a change that
is “caused by” that intervening event; the culprit
here is the word “change”—change from what? The
before–after comparison is a change in time from
before to after, but is that a “causal change”? The
answer is almost always “no.”
Our specific application was a project for a ma-
jor pharmaceutical company concerned with their
marketing interventions with doctors for the pur-
pose of promoting sales of a particular “life-style”
drug. The marketing interventions could be visit-
ing a doctor to describe the details of the drug (so
called, “detailing”), or it could be dining the doc-
tor at a nice restaurant to convey similar informa-
tion, or it could be providing free samples of the
drug. All of these interventions, and other similar
ones, are designed to lead to “more” prescriptions
(scripts) for the drug written by the detailed doc-
tor. But the critical question is: “more” than what?
The answer is quite clear: more than that doctor
would have written without the visit, dinner or free
sample. Otherwise, the investment has had no posi-
tive return. Marketing interventions are designed to
CAUSE A DIFFERENCE, and this difference, or
change, is generally NOT a change in time.
The causal effect of the intervention on a doctor
is the comparison of something you can see (e.g.,
the number of scripts written after being visited)
with something you cannot see (e.g., the number
of scripts written during the same period of time
without being visited). Causal effects can be well
estimated by essentially no existing statistical soft-
ware based on predictive approaches, because causal
effect estimation differs from simple prediction. Nev-
ertheless, causal effects can often be well estimated
in examples like ours, by propensity score technol-
ogy, described and illustrated later, starting in Sec-
tion 3. Essentially, the idea is to create matched
pairs of units, where one member of the pair has
been exposed to the intervention and the other has
not, but they are otherwise identical before the time
of exposure, that is, they are “clones.” Finding such
clones is a tall order because exact matches are al-
most impossible to find in realistically sized data
sets, and this is where the propensity score technol-
ogy enters.
In the next section we describe the difference be-
tween (1) simple prediction from the past to the fu-
ture and (2) causal effects, and illustrate this distinc-
tion in a couple of totally trivial, but hopefully re-
vealing, artificial examples. We then describe in Sec-
tion 3 the idea of “cloning” for causal effect estimation—
not a new idea, but hopefully expressed in such a
way that makes important points transparent. Here
we also introduce propensity score techniques.
The real example that motivated this presentation
will then be described in Section 4, and diagnostic
information will be presented concerning how suc-
cessful the cloning using propensity scores appeared
to be in this example. The results of our approach
are estimates of individual doctor-level causal ef-
fects, which could be used as building blocks for
addressing complex causal questions involving ROI.
Specifically, these estimated doctor-level causal ef-
fects were then used to create an ordered list of the
unvisited doctors, summarized in Section 5, ranked
from those having large estimated causal effects of
a visit, who should be visited, to those having small
estimated causal effects of a visit, who should not
be visited. In Section 6 we present an evaluation of
our ordered list versus the company’s standard (or
traditional) ordering, and document the superiority
of our causal ordering over their standard ordering,
using the company’s own criteria based on future
scripts written.
Section 7 presents a more mechanical and general
description of the basic methodology (e.g., in terms
of units of analysis rather than doctors). Section 8
continues with a brief description of possible op-
portunities for the general approach in e-commerce.
Section 9 concludes with a discussion of three key
features of our general approach: the absence of any
outcome variables when creating the clones; the op-
portunity to refine the causal estimates using mod-
els relating the outcome variables to background
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characteristics; and the use of traditional predic-
tion models to select units, as defined by their ob-
served background variables, that can be anticipated
to have large causal effects of the intervention, and
thus, a large ROI.
2. A CAUSAL EFFECT IS A “CHANGE,” BUT
NOT A CHANGE IN TIME
Display 1 is a very simple display of the title of this
section. We have one doctor, and at time 1, we have
in the left box the number of scripts that doctor has
written in the six months prior to time 1. We have to
make a choice to visit this doctor to provide details
about the drug of interest, or not to visit. The top
branch of the display represents what will happen if
we visit, that is, detail, the doctor, where the box at
the upper right gives the number of scripts written
in the six months following the visit, up until time 2.
In contrast, the bottom branch represents what will
happen if we do not visit this doctor, and the box at
the bottom right gives the number of scripts written
during the same period of time if the doctor is not
detailed.
The number of scripts written at time 2 given
in the upper right box compared to the number at
time 1 given in the left box is a change in time of the
number of scripts written, but it is not the causal ef-
fect of the visit on number of scripts. It is the change
in scripts written from time 1 to time 2 when the
doctor is visited in between. Analogously, the num-
ber of scripts in the lower right box compared to the
number of scripts in the left box also is a change of
scripts written, and it is also a change in time, but
is not the causal effect of not being visited on the
number of scripts written.
The critical comparison here that is causal is the
comparison of the number of scripts in the top right
box and the number of scripts in the bottom right
box, which is the causal effect of the doctor being
visited versus not visited on the number of scripts
written, which does not involve the box on the left
at all, at least not without some overly strong as-
sumption (e.g., the time-2 box without the visit is
identical to the time-1 box—no change in time if not
visited).
A causal effect is the comparison of the outcome
that would be observed with the intervention and
without the intervention, both measured at the same
point in time. This is indicated by the comparison
of apples with apples at time 2, whereas any com-
parison of something at time 2 with something at
time 1 is indicated by the comparison of apples with
oranges. This point, we know, is obvious, but its
force is sometimes lost in the complication of real
and hypothetical examples. The basic framework is
often described as the “Rubin Causal Model ” (Hol-
land, 1986) for a sequence of articles starting in the
1970s, although the ideas obviously have much older
roots (e.g., see Rubin, 1990, 2005, for some history,
or Imbens and Rubin, 2006, for relationships to the
history of causal inference in economics).
To illustrate, take a look at the specific case in
Display 2, where Doctor A is a high prescribing doc-
tor, writing 10 scripts at time 1, and 15 scripts at
time 2, whether visited in between or not. Clearly,
even though Doctor A writes a large number of scripts,
there is no ROI to visit this doctor (for simplicity we
are ignoring the cost of a detail, but that is simply
a known constant). In contrast, take a look at Dis-
play 3, where Doctor B is a low prescribing doctor,
writing only one script at time 1, and five or fewer at
time 2; yet, Doctor B may be worth visiting, at least
much more so than the higher prescribing Doctor A,
because a visit to Doctor B will cause an increase
in number of scripts from 1 to 5. Whether the four
extra scripts, which are caused by the visit, generate
a positive ROI for the visit depends on the cost of
the visit, the profits from the scripts, and so on.
The point is simply the following: we should make
investment decisions based on a comparison of the
expected returns when making the investment and
when not making the investment: Visit those doc-
tors for whom visiting makes a larger positive dif-
ference. Also, allocate company resources to those
brands (and those marketing tactics) that provide
the greatest marginal positive impact to the com-
pany. Great advice (like “buy low, sell high”), but
how do we do this in practice?
3. THE ESTIMATION OF CAUSAL EFFECTS
The gold standard for the estimation of causal ef-
fects is to conduct randomized experiments, such as
clinical trials, which are essentially required by the
FDA (U.S. Food and Drug Administration) before
approving a drug. An alternative, and one which is
sometimes acceptable, even to the FDA, is to de-
sign and carefully execute an observational study (a
nonrandomized design).
Causal effect estimation is not the simple pre-
diction of future events from past events, although
these activities can play a role in addressing causal
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Display 1. Causal effect vs. prediction for a particular doctor.
Display 2. Example: Doctor A. Temptation is to confuse “prediction” with “causal effect estimation.” Example: Visit high
prescribing doctor. Waste of money to visit this doctor. Intervention has no causal effect. Here Causal Effect= 0.
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questions. Thus, causal effect estimation is not gen-
erally accomplished by: regression, data mining,
neural nets, CART, support vector machines, ran-
dom forests, and so on. Although such techniques
can be helpful, none is central, and they can be es-
pecially helpful after causal effects of the interven-
tion for each unit (e.g., of the visit for each doc-
tor) have been estimated because it may often be
of interest to classify doctors into subgroups based
on background variables describing types of doctors,
where the subgroups differ by the expected size of
their causal effects; this would help future targeting
efforts—more on this in Section 9.
So, specifically, how should we think about causal
effect estimation from real data? This is easy to de-
scribe in principle from the hypothetical database
depicted in Display 4. Each row in the matrix dis-
played there represents one unit (e.g., one doctor),
and the columns represent the measurements on them:
number of scripts written at time 1, background
variables such as age, sex, race, place of doctoral
degree, years of practice, type of practice, the num-
ber of scripts written by time 2 if visited between
time 1 and time 2, the number of scripts written by
time 2 if not visited, and the causal effect of being
visited—the difference between the latter two. The
checked boxes represent observed data values, and
the question marks represent unobserved or missing
values; the causal effects are all either: (1) a check
minus a missing, or (2) a missing minus a check, and
both (1) and (2) are effectively missing, and so the
entire column of causal effects is always effectively
missing.
We describe the process for estimating causal ef-
fects as “cloning” for causal effect estimation. Es-
sentially, for each doctor who was visited, we seek a
“matching” doctor, a “clone,” who was not visited,
and we use that doctor’s observed outcome (i.e.,
number of scripts at time 2) to fill in for the first
doctor’s missing outcome. Similarly, for each doctor
who was not visited, we seek a matching doctor, or
clone, who was visited, and we use that doctor’s ob-
served outcome to fill in for the first doctor’s missing
outcome. If no matching doctor can be found, the
database at hand cannot support causal effect con-
clusions, at least not without relying on assumptions
outside the database (e.g., time-2 scripts without
the visit equal time-1 scripts).
Display 5 is a simple reworking of Display 4 where
all the missing “?” in Display 4 have been replaced
by “!” to indicate that the missing values have been
“found” (really “imputed”) by using the clones. Of
course, finding exact clones for everybody in any real
problem is essentially impossible, and yet the con-
ceptual foundations of the above cloning approach
rely on using all background variables used in mak-
ing the decisions to visit one doctor and not visit
another. Thus, the pressure to collect many such
Display 3. Example: Doctor B. It is much better to visit this doctor. The investment pays off. Here Causal Effect= 4. Pays
to visit to increase business.
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Display 4. Database.
background variables is great, which, in turn, makes
it essentially impossible to find exact clones for any-
one.
The key idea for simplification is to use “propen-
sity score” technology (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
This approach allows all the covariates to be re-
duced to a single covariate. This single covariate,
the propensity score, is essentially the probability of
being visited as a function of all of the background
variables, as estimated from the database. Our ac-
tual implementation incorporates other important
adjustments and refinements, but the essential idea,
and the one being discussed here, is to clone based
on the propensity score. For a simple review of some
ideas underlying propensity scores, see Rubin (1997,
2006). And for some more recent theoretical work,
see Imbens (2000) and Imai and van Dyk (2004); for
a couple of hundred thousand other references, just
Google “propensity score.” Instead of going into de-
tails here, we describe our example, and how propen-
sity scores work there.
4. ILLUSTRATION: AN ANONYMOUS CASE
STUDY
The objective of our actual case study was to pro-
duce a target list of doctors based on the estimated
effects of a marketing intervention, where the doc-
tors who are thought to provide the best ROI would
be visited, at least before the others. That is, we
want the doctors ranked by their estimated causal
effects (due to a visit) on the number of scripts they
would write.
The database consisted of approximately 250,000
doctors in the United States who were active in the
medical area of the drug to be promoted. The script
data came from an industry standard physician-level
prescription database, the sales intervention data
came from the company’s call reporting system and
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Display 5. Database after filling in the blanks.
the doctors’ background characteristics came from
various other sources; these characteristics included
specialty, region of the United States, dates of de-
grees, and more than a hundred other such variables.
The company was (and still is) a top tier U.S. phar-
maceutical company.
Display 6 shows the distribution of what is con-
sidered to be the most important determinant of
whether a rep should visit a doctor: the number of
prescriptions of this class of drugs written in the
recent past. Notice the rather huge distributional
difference between the number of scripts (at time 1)
for those who were not visited on the left, and the
number of scripts (at time 1) for those who were
visited on the right. The doctors who were visited
between time 1 and time 2 wrote about 50% more
prescriptions per doctor at time 1. Why? Possibly
because the salary compensation of the sales reps
who visited the doctors was not tied to causing a
difference but more to the number of total scripts
written by the doctors whom they visited (so they
polished the Ferraris!).
But distributional differences between those not
visited and those visited are not confined to the
number of scripts written at time 1. Display 7 shows
the distributions of their specialties (General Prac-
tice, Family Practice, Internal Medicine, Endocrinol-
ogy, OB/Gynecology, Cardiology) for doctors who
were not visited (left) and who were visited (right).
General Practice was more highly visited, as was
Family Practice and Internal Medicine and Endo-
crinology, whereas OB/GYN was not visited as much.
Similar displays could be created for dozens of other
background variables.
Display 8 presents a single picture that summa-
rizes, at least to a great extent, all such displays.
It presents the distributional comparison for the es-
timated propensity scores for those not visited (top)
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Display 6. Histograms for background variable: Prior Rx Score at time 1.
and those visited (bottom). The label “linear propen-
sity score” means that instead of plotting the esti-
mated probability of being visited, say e, we plot-
ted log[e/(1 − e)]; the reason for doing so is tech-
nical, and is discussed briefly in an applied context
in Rubin (2001). The propensity score, by construc-
tion, is supposed to lead to the worst (i.e., most dis-
crepant) comparison of distributions of any combi-
Display 7. Histograms for background variable: Specialty.
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Display 8. Histograms for summarized background variables: Propensity Score.
nation of the underlying background variables (here
“background variables” includes the scripts written
at time 1). In this example, as in many others, the
estimated propensity scores are found by running a
logistic regression, with visited/not visited as the de-
pendent variable, and all the background variables
(including time-1 scripts) as predictors. Any good
method for predicting the probability of being vis-
ited or not could be used; this is another possible
use for statistical software designed for prediction
or classification.
The differences revealed in Display 8 between the
not-visited and the visited groups in the distribu-
tions of their estimated propensity scores are dra-
matic. Even if we were to allow cloning to be done
only using this variable, there are many not-visited
doctors without clones (i.e., those with linear propen-
sity scores below about 0.1), and there are a col-
lection of visited doctors without clones (i.e., those
with linear propensity scores above 1.0). However,
for the other values of the linear propensity score,
it appears that there will be some clones, at least
if we only consider the propensity score and ignore
the other 100+ background variables.
But can it be valid to focus on this one “com-
pound” variable and ignore the others? In a cer-
tain sense, yes, it is valid. A theorem due to Rosen-
baum and Rubin (1983) implies the following claim
in large samples: Suppose we look in one narrow bin
of propensity scores, say from 0.5 to 0.6, and we
compare the distributions of any background vari-
able for the not-visited and the visited. We will find
that the two distributions are essentially the same,
even though, for some variables (like the number of
visits at time 1 given in Display 6), the overall, un-
binned, distributions for the visited and not visited
are very different. Perhaps this sounds surprising,
but the two distributions for the number of scripts at
time 1 in this propensity score bin are given in Dis-
play 9. These two distributions in Display 9 are not
identical, but they sure are close, much closer than
in Display 6. Display 10 provides the analogous dis-
tributions in the same bin of propensity scores but
for doctor’s specialty. Again, they are not perfectly
matched, but they are much closer than the overall,
unbinned, distributions given in Display 7.
The same thing will be found in this bin for each
of the 100+ background variables that were used to
estimate the propensity score, as well as for each of
the propensity score bins with a reasonable num-
ber of doctors who were not visited and who were
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Display 9. Histograms for a variable in a bin of propensity scores: Prior Rx Score.
Display 10. Histograms for a variable in a bin of propensity scores: Specialty.
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visited on which to base the distributional compar-
isons. The intuition behind this result is the follow-
ing: let us suppose we have a group of visited and
not-visited doctors, all of whom have the identical
propensity score (i.e., a very narrow bin, between
0.29999 and 0.30001, essentially all at 0.3 estimated
probability of being visited). Then each doctor in
this bin has probability 0.3 of being assigned a visit,
and so the not-visited and the visited are only ran-
domly different from each other. And randomiza-
tion assures the same distribution of all background
variables, at least in large samples. But because the
propensity scores were estimated using only some
background variables, this conclusion only holds for
the variables used to create it, not for all background
variables, as with true randomization.
Of great importance, notice that the cloning takes
place using only background information and the in-
formation about which of the doctors were visited.
No outcome data, that is, no time-2 script data, were
available. This is imperative for the honesty of the
cloning and is in stark contrast to model-based pre-
dictive approaches (e.g., see the discussion in Rubin,
2001, 2005; Imbens and Rubin, 2006); this point is
emphasized and discussed further in Section 9.
5. DOCTOR-LEVEL CAUSAL EFFECT
ESTIMATION IN THE CASE STUDY AND
RESULTANT RECOMMENDATIONS
Now our database also had, in addition to whether
each was visited or not between times 1 and 2, and
the background information, the outcome of inter-
est: the number of scripts at time 2 for each of
the doctors. For cloning, this variable was “held in
escrow”—not available. After the clones were cre-
ated, we used those data as follows. Having clones
identified for doctors using their propensity scores,
we filled in the missing values in Display 4 using the
clones’ observed values, and thereby created esti-
mated causal effects for each of the doctors who has
a clone. As stated earlier, some of the doctors, those
with extremely large or small propensity scores, did
not have clones, and so did not have estimated causal
effects; such estimates could have been created, but
this would rely on more assumptions, and that topic
is beyond the scope of this very simple introduction
to the ideas, and is only briefly addressed in Sec-
tion 9.
Having created estimated causal effects for the vis-
its, which were scheduled between time 1 and time 2,
on scripts written at time 2, we then focused on the
question of deciding which of the previously unvis-
ited doctors to visit between now (after time 2) and
time 3, in the future, to maximize ROI. The an-
swer was: order the not-yet-visited doctors by their
estimated causal effects of a visit between time 1
and time 2 on scripts at time 2. We have no data
from time 3, the future, so all that we could do is
hope that the causal effects in the future will be like
those in the past. That is, for the not-yet-visited
doctors, we estimated the causal effects of a visit
between times 2 and 3 by the estimated causal ef-
fect of a visit between time 1 and time 2, which was
simply their estimated number of time-2 scripts if
visited (based on the cloning) minus their observed
number of scripts at time 2 when not visited. (As
mentioned earlier, there were some adjustments and
refinements that we used in the actual application
briefly discussed in Section 9, but the basic idea is
not changed.) And then the not-yet-visited doctors
were ordered by their estimated causal effects.
The obvious recommendation was to visit those
doctors at the top of the list of estimated causal ef-
fects: the top 10% first, then the next 10%, and so
on. The company’s then-current practice was to rec-
ommend visiting doctors according to a “standard
decile” list. This list was based on regression statis-
tics, which predicted the number of scripts written
at time 2 from scripts written at time 1 and back-
ground variables. And the company’s recommenda-
tion was to visit the top 10% first, then the next
10%, and so on. The essential difference between
these two recommendations was how the list was cre-
ated: by “cloning for causal effect estimation” versus
regression prediction. Only in very special circum-
stances would the two lists generate the same or
even similar orderings.
We were also asked by the company to estimate
the result of using their list, which was more or
less being implemented, with a lot of local decision-
making that did not follow it, and what would have
happened if instead they had used our list to order
the doctors.
6. VALIDATION OF ORDERING BY
ESTIMATED CAUSAL EFFECTS
Among the previously (at time 2) not-visited doc-
tors, some were visited between time 2 and time 3,
and some were not visited. As stated above, the sales
reps were not very adherent to the lists they were
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supposed to follow, possibly because of their own as-
sessments of who was going to be a big script writer
in the near future, possibly because of personal con-
nections, and so on. The company had the data on
the number of scripts written in a November and
the following January, and they wanted to estimate
the relative effectiveness of the two lists for predict-
ing the effect of a December detail, where they con-
sidered the change in the number of scripts writ-
ten from November to January to be the estimated
causal effect of the visit for each of these previously
unvisited doctors.
In particular, we were to order all visited-in-Decem-
ber doctors according to both lists, then compare
the average estimated causal effect in the top decile
of our list and the average estimated causal effect
in the top decile of their traditional list. And we
were to continue down both lists, comparing decile
by decile. The results are shown in Display 11.
Although all estimated average causal effects were
small (to be fair, the time involved to see any causal
effects was very short), our top decile was much su-
perior to their traditional top decile. In fact, their
list revealed a negative estimated causal effect of a
December visit on scripts for the doctors in their
top decile, whereas the doctors in the top decile
of our list revealed a positive estimated causal ef-
fect. Our corresponding seventh, eighth and ninth
deciles also included doctors with positive and su-
perior causal effects; deciles 2 through 6 were noisy,
but suggested positive causal effects for doctors in
our deciles. Of substantial interest, the doctors for
whom we predicted the worst effect of a Decem-
ber visit, our decile 1 group, had the worst causal
effects—quite negative. In contrast, the doctors in
the bottom decile for the traditional list turned out
to have had a larger positive estimated causal effect
of the December visit than any other decile from
the traditional list—the exact opposite of what the
company hoped! Even more dramatic results were
obtained for the causal effects of 8+ details over
more months—see Display 12.
The conclusion from this validation phase seems
fairly clear: Use the estimated causal effects to cre-
ate targeting lists; do not use the traditional list
based on predicted scripts. This policy change should
result in a better return on investment. Of course,
there are various institutional barriers to any policy
change that is dramatic, such as following this rec-
ommendation. For example, the way sales reps are
compensated may have to be altered so that they do
not get rewarded for “polishing Ferraris” to make
them faster, to use the analogy from earlier.
Targeting individual doctors is just one of the
many tasks that can be performed with such causal
effect estimation. For example, once individual doctor-
level causal effects are estimated, all of the usual pre-
diction and classification methods can be highly ap-
propriate for the prediction of types or subgroups of
doctors outside the original database who are worth
targeting because similar types in the database are
predicted to have large estimated causal effects. This
will be discussed in Section 9 in more depth, after
brief discussions of some details of the methodology
and some potential applications in e-commerce.
7. MORE DETAILS ABOUT THE METHOD
This section provides a more explicit roadmap for
the practitioner regarding the steps involved in such
an analysis. This roadmap, Display 13, is presented
by way of a flow diagram with accompanying brief
discussion of each of seven steps that can be used to
define the approach.
1. Assemble data sources. Though self-evident in
its necessity, this step may well be one of the most
time-consuming practically, because a data source
that has a rich collection of covariates is frequently
one that has been assembled from a variety of sources.
In the example here, it would comprise prescribing
data, physician demographic data, elements from
the call database (e.g., the data source that con-
tains information on the rep’s details), geographic
information (rural/urban, e.g.) and HMO coverage
indicators.
Of course the individual units in such data sources
need not be individual doctors or even people. These
units could be households; they could be medical
practices; or they could even be cities, with radio
advertisements serving as the intervention. Another
possible unit is that of a retailing location (Singh,
Hansen and Blattberg, 2006).
2. Establish the definition of the intervention or
“promotional event.” For example, we could formu-
late the intervention as zero details versus one detail,
or we could formulate it as zero details versus one
or more details. It is up to the practitioner to de-
cide which question is the most relevant. A common
notation for the intervention is to denote it by the
indicator Z, where Z = 1 for the units that received
the intervention and Z = 0 for those that did not.
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Display 11. The estimated effect of a single visit.
Display 12. The estimated effect of multiple visits.
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Display 13. A roadmap for implementing the basic propensity score methodology.
3. Estimate the unit-level probabilities of receiv-
ing the intervention as a function of the unit’s val-
ues of covariates; that is, estimate e = P (Z = 1|X)
where X denotes the covariates. These probabilities
may be estimated by a variety of methods, the most
common probably being logistic regression, but any
predictive modeling methodology could be appropri-
ate here.
4. Stratify (or bin) the units into groups based on
their estimated values of e, that is, their estimated
propensity score.
5. Run diagnostic tests (see Rosenbaum and Ru-
bin, 1984; Rubin, 2001, as illustrated in Displays
9 and 10) to ensure balance has been met. Balance
is used in the sense that the distribution of the co-
variates within the propensity score bins should be
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the same regardless of whether Z = 0 or Z = 1. One
of the common misconceptions with the methodol-
ogy is the belief that the individual clone pairs have
to be very similar on all characteristics, as in the
common understanding of a matched pair, but that
is in fact not the case. They need only be similar
in this distributional sense as just described when
global causal effects are to be estimated. Similarly, if
more refined questions are asked within specific sub-
groups, then distributional balance in the covariates
needs to be achieved within the subgroup.
If balance has not been achieved, refine the model
for the propensity scores until it is satisfactory, that
is, return to step 3. It is often the case that some
of the estimated propensity scores are so extreme
in either the positive or negative direction that no
close match can be found. In this situation, we re-
move these units from the analysis with the acknowl-
edgment that the data set is uninformative with re-
gard to estimating their causal effects without rely-
ing on extraneous assumptions. In an ideal world,
we would recommend this group for experimenta-
tion, though practically the units with very high
estimated propensity scores tend to be high value
with respect to revenue, so that there will likely
be a strong reluctance to “experiment” with this
group.
6. Use the matching to find clone pairs. Though
straightforward in concept, there are many avail-
able algorithms for this step, including “greedy” and
”optimal” methods (e.g., see Rosenbaum, 1989, and
Gu and Rosenbaum, 1993). In addition, there may
be benefits achieved in moving beyond one-to-one
matching, and in the work presented here we used
one to ten matching to reduce the variability of the
casual effect estimates, possibly at the expense of a
little bias (e.g., for some discussion, see Ming and
Rosenbaum, 2000, and Rubin and Thomas, 2000).
7. Estimate the casual effect. The elegance of the
approach is really revealed in the final estimation
step where the outcome variable is simply differ-
enced between the elements of a clone pair. This
provides an estimate of an individual level causal
effect. These individual level effects may be aggre-
gated within any subgroup of interest, and in the
pharmaceutical example presented here, one could,
for instance, be particularly interested in the effi-
cacy of regional sales forces, or the deciles of a tar-
get list. We take one additional opportunity to point
out that this is the only place in the entire analysis
where the outcome variable is used (the Y in “es-
crow” idea again).
8. OPPORTUNITIES FOR APPLICATIONS IN
E-COMMERCE
Propensity score methods can be applicable when-
ever there is a desire to estimate the impact of an
intervention, and it is particularly relevant when the
intervention is not applied on a randomized basis
but we think we have the major background vari-
ables that influence which treatment is received.
To illustrate with an e-commerce example, take an
online store with an e-mail membership database.
Some of these members have opted-in to receive a
monthly e-mail newsletter, but the company does
not know whether the resources they put into pro-
ducing the newsletter make financial sense. It is clear
that the newsletter has not been randomized to mem-
bers, and indeed, those individuals who opted to re-
ceive the newsletter may be systematically different
from those who did not.
The propensity score approach to this problem
would be to use a set of covariates describing all
the members, which should almost certainly include
prior purchasing behavior, and create a model for
the probability they received the newsletter. With
this estimation completed, that is, with the propen-
sity scores estimated, the matching can proceed and
the causal effect of the newsletter estimated by the
average difference in revenue between the clones,
those receiving the newsletter and those not receiv-
ing the newsletter.
Another similar example would be to find the ROI
of a free shipping initiative, where again individ-
uals opt-in to receive the free shipping but pay a
modest yearly fee for it. Again, the “treatment”—
free shipping—is not randomized to respondents, so
a naive comparison of the purchasing behavior of
those who receive it to those who do not would not
lead to a valid ROI estimate.
A subsequent use ideally suited to e-commerce
could follow from this previous activity. If a pre-
dictive model for the individual-level causal effects
of the free shipping promotion themselves were cre-
ated, then this model could be used to determine
who should be targeted with the free shipping; es-
sentially we would not want to offer the free ship-
ping to someone who would have spent the money
anyway, but rather we would like to target the free
shipping toward those for whom it is most effective,
where effective is understood in the sense of those
with the largest causal effects of the free shipping.
A particularly interesting opportunity would oc-
cur if activity on the website itself could be used to
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generate some of the background covariates in this
predictive model for causal effects. To illustrate with
an example that is based on our experience, consider
a pharmaceutical company with a prescription drug
and a consumer-orientated website providing infor-
mation on the drug. The offering of a coupon to
encourage trial use of the drug is common on such
sites. But to whom should the coupon be offered
and for how much? Ideally we would offer it to the
more “valuable” customers. With a predictive model
for the causal effect of the coupon using covariates
based on website behavior as measured through the
click-stream log (see Bucklin et al., 2002; Montgomery
et al., 2004), the company could have an on-the-fly
method for generating such offers. Indeed, we have
found, in previous proprietary work, that page trails
and specific pages visited on a website were related
to potential customer value, albeit self-reported
through intent to purchase. However, the potential
for the methodology to be used in the targeting
arena is certainly strong with a predictive model for
causal effects available.
When individual causal effects are a focus, refine-
ments to the estimates based solely on clones can be
highly useful. We now turn to a brief discussion of
such refinements which use statistical models to help
create smoother unit-level causal effect estimates.
9. THE ROLE OF MODELS WHEN
ESTIMATING CAUSAL EFFECTS
Of substantial importance, the propensity score
approach to causal inference in business advocated
here has focused on the theme that the design of
an observational study should parallel the design of
a randomized experiment. That is, our propensity
score approach is accomplished without any access
to outcome data (the Y-variable in escrow paradigm),
and it seeks to create samples of units who were
exposed to the intervention and who were not ex-
posed to the intervention that are as similar as pos-
sible to each other pre-intervention. This approach
is in stark contrast to the standard approach in eco-
nomics and statistics based on the fitting and refit-
ting of straight lines or similar models, where the
estimated causal effect is given by the estimated
coefficient of an indicator variable for exposure to
the intervention. This approach has been known for
many years to fail in general (e.g., Cochran and Ru-
bin, 1973; LaLonde, 1986). In these same situations,
matching alone or in combination with modeling has
been successful (e.g., see Dehejia and Wahba, 1999;
Rubin and Thomas, 2000, and their references).
A real problem with the traditional approach to
causal inference is that the estimated answers are
constantly being seen and altered as models are fit
and refit. Also, because typically the intervention
and control groups are far apart, for example, as
revealed by Displays 6, 7 and 8 in our example, dif-
ferent models will effectively imply different extrap-
olations, with possibly wildly differing answers from
which the analyst can pick and choose. This picking
and choosing is often done by someone who is ef-
fectively in a “conflict of interest” position because
there is often knowledge of what the client would like
to see concerning the intervention being evaluated.
This is no way to achieve honest answers, even if
the data analysts are honest—the unconscious pres-
sures to find one sort of “appealing” answer are often
tremendous.
The advantage to the modeling approach is that
when the models are appropriate, the resulting causal
estimates can be more efficient and precise than the
propensity score cloned estimates. This is no reason
to give up the objectivity of the propensity score ap-
proach, but it does suggest using the modeling ap-
proach to refine the causal estimates based on the
matched samples. In fact, we have applied such re-
finements with success to obtain more reliable unit-
level causal effects in our own work.
Additionally, once we have reliably estimated in-
dividual causal effects, with or without the aid of
models it can be highly useful to try to predict these
estimated causal effects from background variables
that are available in the samples used to estimate
the causal effects, as well as in future groups of
units that we may wish to target for the interven-
tion. Obviously, the type of unit that is predicted
to have a large estimated causal effect is the one
to target first. Also, such predictions can be very
important for allocating resources. For such alloca-
tions, standard statistical prediction models can be
entirely appropriate, and their use does not inter-
fere with the objective and honest estimation of the
basic unit-level causal effects based, fundamentally,
on the creation of the clones.
We hope that this simple introduction has stim-
ulated more appreciation for the relevance and im-
portance of taking the estimation of causal effects
seriously, and how it generally differs from simple
prediction.
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